THE LIMITS OF THE LAW:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PROSTITUTION
CONTROL IN THREE CANADIAN CITIES

E. NICK LARSEN t

INTRODUCTION

Prostitution represents one of the more problematic and frustrating
socio-legal dilemmas confronting contemporary democratic societies.
An important aspect of this dilemma centres on the contradiction
between the liberal contention that prostitution is a victimless crime
which ought to be tolerated, and the moral disapproval expressed by
conservative and religious forces.
This linear opposition is
complicated by the participation of many feminist groups, who argue
that prostitution represents the ultimate expression of patriarchal
relations. Although not all feminist groups advocate the same legal
approach to prostitution, their involvement cuts across the liberalconservative debate and helps ensure that clear cut solutions are rarely
implemented.I Thus, contemporary western societies have frequently
adopted compromise positions, whereby selected aspects of prostitution
are prohibited by relatively minor criminal laws, but prostitution itself
is neither criminal nor fully legal. This unclear status leaves the
participants trapped in an uncertain existence, where their activities are
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1.
For a more detailed discussion of the dilemma which prostitution presents for
feminists, see Jody Freeman, The FeministDebateover ProstitutionReform: ProstitutesRights
Groups, RadicalFeminists and the [impossibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 75
(1989) (placing feminist debate within the context of existing U.S. and Canadian prostitution
laws); Belinda Cooper, Prostitution:A Feminist Analysis, 11 WOMEN'S Rgs. L. REP. 99
(1989) (evaluating different philosophical and legal approaches to prostitution).
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tolerated much of the time, but they are nevertheless constantly
vulnerable to police crackdowns and political manipulation.2
The situation becomes particularly problematic in the case of
street prostitution, which frequently involves public order concerns of
considerable magnitude. In most large North American cities, street
prostitution is concentrated in business and residential areas near the
city centre, which makes the trade accessible to visitors.
Unfortunately, it also precipitates conflict with the people who live and
work in these areas, and it is this conflict which creates the dilemma
for police forces. Because most street prostitution activities are legally
classified as minor offenses, the police are limited in terms of both the
priority which they can assign to prostitution control and their ability
to deal effectively with street prostitution.3 In order to obtain enough
evidence to support charges, police must resort to time consuming
entrapment techniques which are heavily criticized by civil libertarian
and feminist groups, albeit for slightly different reasons. Police
enforcement efforts rarely satisfy the more concerned residents and
business owners because their enforcement strategies are largely
ineffective at suppressing, or even managing, the nuisance associated
with street prostitution. Thus, police forces frequently become
involved in volatile political debates which force them to choose
between expending large amounts of resources on what is, legally a
minor offence, or ignoring the problem and being accused of
abdicating their responsibility to protect the public and maintain order.
Although the above scenario could likely apply to numerous large
cites in Canada and the United States, recent changes to Canadian laws
on prostitution provide an excellent illustration of the furor which

2.

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see John Lowman. You Can Do It

But Don't Do it Here, in REGULATING SEX: AN ANTHOLOGY OF COMMENTARIES ON THE

BADGELY AND FRASER REPORTS 193 (John Lowman et al. eds., 1986) (detailing the sociolegal debate leading up to the implementation of Bill C-49, which only entrenched this

dichotomy). See also Anywhere But Here (video of the BC Learning Resources Institute,
Vancouver, B.C., 1992).

3.
For example, the most commonly charged prostitution-related activity in Canada
is "communicating for the purposes of prostitution." See R.S.C., Ch. C-46, § 212.1 (1992)
(Can.). This is a summary offence which limits police powers in several key respects. See

R.S.C.. Ch. C-46 §§ 785-840 (1992) (Can.).

Similar offenses in many U.S. states are

classified as misdemeanors, with similar limitations.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol3/iss1/4

1996]

THE LIMITS OF THE LAW

characterizes prostitution control. These changes, popularly referred
to as Bill C-49, were enacted in December of 1985, largely as a result
of public and police dissatisfaction with the previous law.4 Because
Bill C-49 represents one of the toughest approaches to prostitution
control in North America, its provisions have been extremely
controversial and the law has been subjected to several qualitative and
quantitative evaluations of its effectiveness. Almost all of these
evaluations, including the official one conducted by the Canadian
Department of Justice, have concluded that the new law has not been
effective at its two primary aims of reducing the overall numbers of
prostitutes and controlling the levels of nuisance associated with street
prostitution.'
Further, the new law has been only marginally
successful at its third goal of ensuring equal enforcement against male
customers and female prostitutes.6
The relative ineffectiveness of Bill C-49 has renewed the
prostitution debate in Canada, and many groups are demanding even
tougher provisions to deal with street prostitution. Indeed, the
Canadian Minister of Justice has recently announced plans for more
stringent legislation,7 despite arguments from liberal and feminist
groups that tougher laws are not the answer to problems associated
with prostitutions In this respect, several researchers have argued
that it is possible to control prostitution effectively without resorting
to unduly harsh laws.9 This article will conduct a comparative
analysis of the manner in which Bill C-49 has been implemented in

4.

See infra note 24 for full text of Bill C-49.

5.
J. FLIESCHMAN, STREET PROSTITUTION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE LAW:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 41 (Can. Dept. of Justice, 1989).
6.
Id.
7.
Mark Hume & Petti Fong, Police Welcome Plan to Toughen ProstitutionLaw.
VANCOUVER SuN, Sept. 22. 1994, at Al, A2.
8.
Mark Hume, ProstitutionPlan Misses Mark, Expert Says. VANCOUVER SUN,

Sept. 23, 1994, at Al. This decision has been applauded by police and local politicians but
criticized by other groups.

See E. Nick Larsen, Time to Legalize Prostitution, POLiCY

OPTIoNs, Sept. 1992, at 21 [hereinafter Larsen, Legalization].
9.

See Robert Gemme, Prostitution: A Legal, Criminological and Sexological

Perspective, 2 CAN. J. HuM. SEXuALrrY 227 (1993); John Lowman. Street Prostitution
Control Some Canadian Reflections on the Finsbury Park Experience, 32 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992); Larsen, Legalization, supra note 8.
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Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. 10 An attempt will be made to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the different enforcement
strategies in terms of both reducing the numbers of street prostitutes
and reducing conflicts among prostitutes, residents and business
owners." This analysis is situated within a combined class and
feminist framework and the article will conclude with several
recommendations regarding the most effective way of controlling
prostitution. However, before commencing this analysis, it is
necessary to outline the background events which precipitated Bill C49.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Events PrecipitatingBill C-49
Prior to December, 1985, street prostitution in Canada was
covered primarily by Section 195.1 of the Canadian Criminal Code
which prohibited "soliciting for the purposes of prostitution."' 2
Although this law was considered satisfactory by most police officers
and politicians, several anomalies were problematic from a feminist
perspective. For example, some courts limited the definition of
"prostitute" to females only, and thus male prostitutes could not be
convicted under the section. Likewise, the law did not apply to male
customers, since only prostitutes could "solicit for the purpose of

10.
These cities were selected because they are Canada's largest cities and also had
proportionately larger prostitution problems than other Canadian cities. In addition, a variety
of police strategies were used and the police departments exhibited widely differing
organizational characteristics.
11.
This study will not include the numbers of charges and/or convictions as
evaluation criteria for effective prostitution control. Because too many other factors affect
police charging practices. they are not a reliable indicator of the two main goals. Thus,
charges will only be examined to assess the degree to which the law is applied equally to
males and females.
12.
Other provisions prohibited "common bawdy houses" and "living off the avails
of prostitution". See R.S.C., Ch. C-46 §§ 210, 212(i) (1992) (Can.). These laws remain
relatively unchanged today.
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prostitution" in the eyes of Canadian courts.13 Under increasing
pressure from feminist and civil libertarian groups, the courts began
to chip away at some of these anomalies and also restrict the definition
of soliciting. The major court decision which ultimately made the law
almost impossible to enforce occurred in 1978, when the Supreme
Court of Canada ruled that soliciting was not an offence unless it was
"pressing and persistent." 14
This decision caused an immediate uproar, with the police, some
politicians, many residents groups and even some members of the
judiciary arguing that the decision gave prostitutes almost unlimited
rights to operate wherever they pleased, as long as they didn't
physically attack potential customers. This argument was probably
exaggerated, but there is little doubt that the Hutt decision appeared
to correlate with a drastic increase in the numbers of prostitutes on the
streets of major Canadian cities. Although there is considerable
disagreement over the degree to which the increase in prostitution was
attributable to the Hutt decision, 5 there is little doubt that the
decision exerted a profound effect on police behaviour. The most
vocal police reaction occurred in Vancouver; however, most police
forces gradually ceased attempting to enforce the law as it became
obvious that charges could not succeed. It also became apparent that
Canadian police forces had embarked on a concerted political
campaign to force the federal government to enact much tougher laws
for the control of street prostitution. While the police departments
were undoubtedly concerned about the increasing levels of conflict

13.
For a fuller explanation, see E. Nick Larsen, The Politics of Prostitution
Control: Interest Group Politics in Four Canadian Cities, 16 INT'L J.URB. & REGIONAL RES.
169 (1992) [hereinafter Larsen, Politics].
14.
Hutt v. R., 82 D.L.R. 3d 95 (1978).
15.
See John Lowman, Prostitutionin Vancouver: Some Notes on the Genesis of a
Social Problem, 28 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986). Lowman argues that the Vancouver
problems were more closely related to the closure of two nightclubs which catered to

prostitutes and their customers. This action drove large numbers of prostitutes onto the street.
where they migrated to business and residential areas. See also Larsen, Politics.supra note
13, at 187. Larsen links the problem to patterns of gentrification occurring in major cities.
This process, which peaked during the late 1970's and early 1980's, saw previously run down
houses in prostitution areas bought and renovated by middle class professionals, who then
lobbied for the removal of the prostitutes.
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over street prostitution,16 some evidence suggests that the police were
also motivated by pragmatic organizational concerns. Inasmuch as the
police traditionally relied on prostitutes as informers, the Hutt decision
effectively deprived them of this source of information by reducing
their power to pressure prostitutes into informant roles. On a more
positive note, it also reduced the power of pimps, and many prostitutes
began turning their pimps over to the police and agreeing to testify
against them in court. 7
While it is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a detailed
analysis of the police role in the post-Hutt political debate, the political
conflict continued to escalate across Canada, and the Canadian
government established the Special Committee on Pornography and
Prostitution, commonly known as the Fraser Committee, to study the
problem and make recommendations. This Committee commissioned
original research and held public hearings in twenty-two cities and
towns across Canada. Various officials, politicians, interest groups
and members of the public were invited to express their views on
prostitution. The testimony was divided almost equally between
groups (including the police, residents and politicians) wanting stricter
laws and groups advocating a more decriminalized approach to the
problem.18 The Fraser Committee ultimately tabled a report which
identified the nuisance effect as the major problem to be addressed,
The Committee further advocated that the laws be amended to
accomplish the dual goals of minimizing the nuisance to citizens while
also allowing prostitutes to practice their profession. Specifically, the
Committee recommended that most prostitution-related activities
should be decriminalized, that small numbers of prostitutes should be
allowed to operate out of their residences, and that the laws dealing
with the exploitation of prostitutes should be strengthened. 9 The
16.

In this respect, the police in Vancouver were certainly justified in their concern

over the escalating conflict between prostitutes and their pimps on one hand and residents and
business owners on the other. There were almost daily accounts of residents carrying out

"hooker patrols" armed with baseball bats. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
17.
See Larsen. Legalization, supra note 8, at 21.
18.
Flieschman. supra note 5, at 4.
19.
Special Committee on Pornographyand Prostitution, 2 PORNOGRAPHY AND
PROSTITUTION IN CANADA 531-38 (1985) (explaining findings and proposing
Recommendations 55, 56. & 57).
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Committee also recommended that the provinces and municipalities be
empowered to regulate prostitution like any other business, since
prostitution itself was and is legal in Canada.O
The latter
recommendation was particularly interesting, since several
municipalities, including Calgary, Montreal, Vancouver and Niagara
Falls, Ontario had passed bylaws regulating prostitution after the Hutt
decision. While these laws were reasonably successful, they were
ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada. 2
Unfortunately, the Canadian government failed to act on any
recommendations of the Fraser Committee, and instead introduced Bill
C-49 which significantly strengthened the laws against prostitution.
B. Methodology For The Present Study
The data for Toronto and Vancouver is based primarily on a
qualitative research study carried out during 1989. The major
methodological steps included in-depth media searches in all three
cities, a series of in-depth unstructured interviews2 with police
officials, officials in the Federal Ministry of Justice and the
appropriate provincial Ministries of the Attorney General, municipal
politicians, local interest group leaders, and the analysis of existing
documents such as the minutes of municipal council meetings, position
papers published by community groups, research reports, committee
reports and Hansard.3 This study was replicated on a much smaller
scale in 1992 and a media search was conducted in 1994-95.
The data for Montreal is based entirely on previously published
sources, including the official evaluation conducted by the Canadian
Department of Justice. Aside from a media search, no primary

20.

Id.

21.
Under the Canadian constitution, only the federal government can pass criminal
laws, and that provincial and municipal governments are prohibited from regulating
prostitution because some aspects are covered by the Criminal Code of Canada. See Gemnme.
supra note 9, at 228. Thus, the Criminal Code would have to be amended to specifically
allow provinces and municipalities to regulate prostitution.
22.

For a detailed reporting of these interviews, see E. Nick Larsen, The Politics

of Prostitution Control: A Qualitative Analysis of the Development and Implementation of Bill
C-49 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manitoba) (on file with author).
23.
Reports of Parliamentary Debates.
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research was conducted in Montreal. For this reason, the comparisons
between Montreal and the other cities are hampered by the limitations
of the Department of Justice evaluation.
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BILL C-49,
THE COMMUNICATING LAW

Bill C-49 was proclaimed into law on December 28, 1985 amidst
some of the most bitter controversy ever engendered with respect to
Canadian criminal legislation. Referred to as the "cormmunicating
law," this legislation effectively criminalized all public communication
for the purposes of prostitution. 4 Although most Canadian police
forces and many residents' and business groups welcomed the new
law, many other groups argued that the law was neither necessary nor
likely to solve the problems associated with street prostitution. In
particular, many civil rights groups expressed fears that the law's
draconian provisions would lead to overkill and might result in
innocent people being convicted on the basis of a "wink or a nod."
Although some police forces attempted to meet these concerns by
adopting enforcement policies designed to ensure that overkill did not

24.

BILL C-49 PROVISIONS:

(1) Every person who in a public place or in any place open to public view:
a) stops or attempts to stop any motor vehicle, impedes the free flow of pedestrian or
vehicular traffic or ingress to or egress from premises adjacent to that place, or
b) stops or attempts to stop any person or in any manner communicates or attempts to
communicate with any person for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining
the sexual services of a prostitute is guilty of an offence punishable on summary
conviction.
(2)

In this section, "public place" includes any place to which the public have access as of
right or by invitation, express or implied, and any motor vehicle located in a public
place or in any place open to public view.

R.S.C., Ch. C-46 § 213 (1992) (Can.)
Bill C-49 was originally codified as § 195.1. The number has since been changed to
§ 213; thus, the term Bill C-49 will be used throughout to avoid ambiguity or confusion.
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occur, considerable variation emerged among the three cities included
in this study. In order to facilitate the analytical goals outlined in the
introduction, this section will discuss the enforcement policies of the
three cities separately before conducting a critical comparison of the
relative effectiveness of the different approaches.
A. The Communicating Law In Vancouver
The Vancouver police immediately adopted an aggressive
approach to the implementation of Bill C-49. During the first few
weeks of January, 1986, the Vice Squad conducted several sweeps in
all of the prostitution strolls in Vancouver.25 The new law initially
appeared to exert the desired effect, as both the number of arrests and
the number of visible prostitutes remained low throughout the first
month of implementation in all areas.'
Although this situation
prompted several politicians and community leaders to proclaim the
law a success, this optimism was not borne out by subsequent events.
According to one source close to the prostitution community,
prostitutes had only been staying off the streets until they had a sense
of how the Vancouver police would enforce the new law. 27 They
quickly returned to the streets and the number of arrests increased as
they reappeared in greater numbers. There were also several
challenges based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
and a non-binding Provincial Court decision overturning the law
increased the numbers of prostitutes returning to the streets.' The
25.
Responsibility for prostitution control was divided between the Vice Squad and
uniformed patrol teams. The Vice Squad used a combination of routine undercover work and
major sweeps in which entire areas were blanketed for several hours. The uniformed patrol
teams were responsible for order maintenance calls and attempting to deter prostitution activity
through routine patrols in prostitution areas.
26.
Scott McDonald & Chris Rose,Anti-ProstitutionGroupsApplaudPoliceActions.
VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 8, 1986, at A3.
27.
Interview with Marie Arrington, President of the Vancouver chapter of
Prostitutes and Other Women for Equal Rights (POWER), in Vancouver, B.C. (May 1989).
Arrington also founded the Alliance for the Safety of Prostitutes (ASP).
28.
See R. v. Tremayne (B.C. Prov. Ct. 1986). Because Provincial Court rulings
are not binding on other courts, the decision did not preclude further charges. However.
future prostitution charges were placed on hold pending the outcome of appeals, although the
police continued to lay charges.
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situation was further exacerbated when the Vancouver mayor directed
the Vancouver Police to move against several bawdy houses,2 9 thus
forcing even more prostitutes out on the street. Considering that a
primary goal was to keep prostitutes off the street, this action suggests
that the Vancouver Police and City Council had failed to develop a
coherent strategy for dealing with prostitution.
The above mentioned constitutional challenges were overruled by
the British Columbia Supreme Court on May 7, 1986,30 and the
police adopted even tougher measures against prostitutes. Prosecutors
began routinely asking that area restrictions be made part of probation
orders for convicted prostitutes,3" even though this tactic simply
pushed most prostitutes to the edge of the restricted area. In any
event, the prostitutes appeared to have overcome their fear of the new
law and continued to remain on the streets in enough numbers to
constitute a continuing problem from the perspective of many
community groups. Because the area restrictions did not apply to
customers, a steady supply of customers was ensured. Many
commentators argued that prostitutes would remain on the street as
long as there was business. The practice was also criticised by
prostitutes' spokespersons and some defence lawyers because it
contravened the principle of equal enforcement.32
The debate over Bill C-49 continued, and by late 1986 it was clear
that it was not the definitive solution that many people had expected.
Once prostitutes overcame their fear of the law, they quickly
developed new strategies to cope with it, including not discussing

29.
Keith Baldrey, City to Seek Action on Complaints, VANCOUVER SUN, Mar. 27,
1986, at A3.

30.

The constitutionality of Bill C-49 was challenged inseveral provinces until it was

ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in December 1990. See Ref. re §§ 193,
195.1(1)(C) of the Criminal Code. 56 C.C.C.3d 65 (1990) (Can.). The various court
decisions will not be discussed unless they are relevant to enforcement practices.
31.
Mike Bocking & Anne Fletcher. Judge Cites Nuisance, Concern, VANCOUVER
SUN. May 9. 1986, at A3. In fact, the area restrictions may have exacerbated the problem by
expanding the red light area. Referred to by some as the "creeping red light district"
phenomenon, it spread the problem of street prostitution over a larger area and increased the
amount of public outcry.
32.
Interview with Marie Arrington, supra note 27; interview with Tony Serka and

Bridget Eider, defence attorneys in Vancouver, B.C. (May 1989).
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anything until inside the potential customer's car and waiting for the
customer to make the first offer.33 Although the Vancouver police
appeared satisfied with the law, many community groups argued that
it was clearly a sham. This was particularly true of the Mount
Pleasant area, a working class neighbourhood near the city centre.
The Vancouver Police Department had stopped responding to
prostitution-related calls from the area, and many residents became
convinced that the Vancouver police were using Mount Pleasant as a
"dumping ground" for street prostitution because of its lower social
and economic status.'
In response to these criticisms, the Mount Pleasant Task Force
was established to coordinate police efforts during the summer months
of 1986 to 1988. The Task Force experimented with several
harassment tactics and organized periodic blitzes against prospective
customers. In addition, it increased the frequency of visible uniformed
patrols near where prostitutes were working to discourage customers
from cruising the area."5 Although the Task Force was reasonably
effective, its tactics were not dependent on Bill C-49, and could have
been used before the bill was implemented. Further, the activities of
the Task Force displaced large numbers of prostitutes into the
Downtown Eastside area, including the respectable working class area
known as Strathcona.36
33.
34.

Interview with Marie Arrington, supra note 27.
Interview with Timothy Agg, leader of Mount Pleasant Committee on Street

Prostitution, in Vancouver, B.C. (May 1989); interview with Phyllis Alfeld, leader of Mount
Pleasant Action Group, in Vancouver, B.C. (May 1989). These two community organizations

were created by residents to attempt to do something about the prostitution problem in Mount
Pleasant. Although these organizations were in fact dominated by professionals moving into
the area, there was significant participation from the original working class residents. In any
case, the perception that the area was working class still remained in the minds of police and
politicians. Interview with Libby Davies, Vancouver Alderperson, Vancouver. B.C. (May
1989).

35.
Interview with Staff Sargeant Thompson. Prostitution Liaison Officer for Team
6, in Vancouver, B.C. (May 1989).
36.
Strathcona is located along the Vancouver Harbour and near Chinatown. It
encompasses skid row, a large area of public housing, some established working class

residential districts and the trendy restaurant and shopping area known as Gastown. Although
the area had always contained significant amounts of prostitution, the transient nature of the
population, combined with its preponderance of seedy bars and other transient-oriented
businesses, minimized conflict.
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The scenario which developed in Strathcona differed significantly

from other areas, largely because both the residents and the police
adopted radically different attitudes towards the problem. Instead of

adopting confrontational tactics, residents entered into negotiations
with the prostitutes in an attempt to reach a solution. The prostitutes
responded by agreeing not to work near schools and negotiating a "no
go" map outlining areas where prostitutes would not work. This map
was distributed to prostitutes working in the area, who were asked to
avoid the indicated areas.

This approach was reinforced when the

police became involved in negotiations between prostitutes and
residents, and even suggested that patrol personnel would tolerate

some prostitution if the prostitutes stayed away from schools and
residential areas. Patrol officers were directed to steer prostitutes back
toward commercial streets if they were found in residential areas.37

If a prostitute seemed determined to remain in a "no go" area, the
police would harass her and even park a marked police cruiser nearby
"until she got the message." 38 These tactics have been continued by
the uniformed patrol team responsible for the area, and recent research
indicates that the police have extended their liaison work with
prostitutes to include regular consultations with the affected groups.39

37.
Robert Sarti, Hookers Reach Truce on StrathconaFront, VANCOUVERSUN, Apr.
20, 1988, at B5.
38.
Interview with Sargeant Biddlecomb, Vancouver Police Department, Team 3,
in Vancouver, B.C. (May 1989). Although the majority of the evidence supports the
cooperation scenario, there was some disagreement about the effectiveness of the initial police
response to the Strathcona situation. A group of Strathcona residents who were unhappy with
the levels of street prostitution in the area organized the Strathcona Prostitution Action
Committee (SPAC) in May of 1988. The group organized a short lobbying campaign aimed
at Vancouver Police and City Hall. This quickly resulted in the formation of a Special Police
Liaison Committee for Strathcona, which met with the dissatisfied residents and drew up a
plan of increased uniformed patrols. Three area prostitutes also attended the meeting and
participated in the discussion and negotiations over the problem. See Vancouver City
Manager's Report to Council (Aug. 26, 1988). This appeared to resolve the issue, as there
was no further indication of trouble in the area.
39.
Interview with Constable Griff Simons, Vancouver Police Department, Team
3, in Vancouver. B.C. (Feb. 1992). Constable Simons stated that he and his partner made
a point of developing rapport with prostitutes in their area so as to facilitate their cooperation.
They also attended monthly liaison meetings with prostitutes, residents and business owners.
This approach is apparently working well, and informants from organizations in the area
expressed satisfaction with the police activity. Further, one community leader informed this
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Thus, although there continues to be significant amounts of prostitution
activity in the Strathcona area, there is remarkably little conflict!2
In summary, it is clear that the Bill C-49 was not effective in
reducing the number of street prostitutes in Vancouver.4 Although
it did give the police force a somewhat greater ability to control the
areas in which prostitutes worked, and thus helped quiet public
controversy, harassment tactics using traffic codes and other noncriminal laws were far more effective. The most effective solution,
however, involved negotiation and other "social work" tactics
practiced by the police and residents in Strathcona. While these tactics
did not appear to reduce the numbers of prostitutes, they did minimize
conflict. Unfortunately, this tactic has been limited to the Strathcona
area, as residents and patrol teams in other areas have been unwilling
to adopt it. As a result, conflict continues in the Mount Pleasant area,
and there is an ongoing media debate regarding the best approach to
the problem.
Two further points need to be made about Bill C-49 in
Vancouver. The first involves the gender imbalance among the people
charged with communicating for the purposes of prostitution.
Feminist groups and spokespersons for the prostitute community
consistently criticised the Vancouver police for concentrating on
female prostitutes to the virtual exclusion of male prostitutes and male
customers. 42 The second point centres on violence against
prostitutes. Unfortunately, the law appeared to correlate with
increased numbers of assaults against prostitutes and several unsolved

writer that-they were very satisfied with the willingness of prostitutes to cooperate. Interview
with Muggs Sigurdson, Stratheona resident, in Vancouver, B.C. (Feb. 1992).
40.
Since 1988, there has been little mention of the Strathcona area in the media.
41.
The official evaluation conducted by the Department of Justice reached similar
conclusions. For example, although the average number of visible prostitutes did decline in
1986, it rebounded to even higher levels in 1987. (The figures were: 1985, 44.0; 1986. 23.6;
1987, 54.2.) JoHN LOWMAN, STREET PROSTUTION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE LAW VANCOUVER 95 (Can. Dept. of Justice. 1989).

42.
Interview with Marie Arrington, supra note 27. interview with Bridget Eider.
supranote 32; interview with Libby Davies, supra note 34. These assertions are supported
by statistics gathered in the Department of Justice evaluation, which indicated a ratio of
prostitutes to customers at approximately 3 to 1 for the period from 1986 through 1988. See
Flieschman, supra note 5, at 41.
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murders of prostitutes in Vancouver. Marie Arrington, of POWER,
and other prostitutes' spokespersons complained that the new law had
increased the amount of violence against prostitutes because it forced
them to enter cars without carefully screening the occupants. POWER
also complained that the practice of seeking area restrictions further
contributed to the problem by forcing prostitutes to work in less safe
areas, such as poorly lit back lanes, and to adopt riskier practices such
as hitchhiking. These practices were dangerous since prostitutes were
unable to screen their customers thoroughly. One spokesperson noted
that only one prostitute was murdered between 1978 and 1985,
whereas forty had been murdered between 1986 and 1992. Similarly,
other defence lawyers reported an increase in the number of "bad
tricks" mentioned by their clients.43 Although this evidence is far
from conclusive, it suggests that Vancouver prostitutes paid a high
price for a less than effective law.
B. The Communicating Law In Toronto
The initial implementation of Bill C-49 in Toronto appeared to
involve much more planning and coordination than had been evident
in Vancouver. After consultation with the prosecutor's office and
other groups, the Toronto Police Department announced several
enforcement guidelines intended to reassure civil libertarian groups
that it would enforce the new law with discretion." However, the
most important policy directive to emerge from the consultation
process involved the decision to concentrate on customers. The
Toronto Police Department adopted a stated goal of "dry[ing] up the
supply of customers" and announced that it would cooperate with

43.
Interview with Bridget Eider and Tony Serka, supra note 32. These statements
are based on impressionistic evidence provided by prostitutes and other informants. Canadian
police do not generally keep statistics on the occupation of victims and thus police data is not

available. The Canadian Department of Justice is currently completing a study of violence
against prostitutes before and after Bill C-49: however, the results are not yet available.
44.
Kirk Makin, Anti-hooker Laws Working-For Now, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 18,
1986. at Al. For example, it was decided that Bill C-49 would be applied only in cases

where there was verbal communication involving a offer of money for a specific sexual act.
It was also decided that the names of both prostitutes and customers would not be published.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol3/iss1/4

19961

THE LIMITS OF THE LAW

social service programs designed to help prostitutes change their
lifestyles.45 The Police Department quickly demonstrated a pattern
of arresting more customers than its counterpart in Vancouver.
Although prostitutes initially remained on the streets in large numbers,
they quickly left once it became clear that police activity was scaring
clients away. In April, 1986, the Toronto Police announced that the
number of prostitutes working the streets had dropped to
approximately one third of their pre-Bill C-49 levels (from 600-700 to
200-300).'
The Police Department claimed that its strategy of
targeting customers was effective because middle class customers
(often with families) were much more easily deterred than prostitutes,
most of whom already had long criminal records.
Police officers and residents were happy with the movement of
prostitutes off the streets; however, this development was not the
complete success that the Toronto police had predicted. Many of the
prostitutes who temporarily vacated the streets moved into escort
agencies.47 Although the police were initially content to watch the
transformation of streetwalkers into callgirls without taking immediate
action,48 it quickly became obvious that the movement into escort
agencies and massage parlours increased the number of pimps and
their ability to dominate the prostitution trade.49 The police were
45.

Ellie Tesher, ProstitutesWill Go Underground.CriticsBelieve, TORONTO STAR.

Jan. 26, 1986, at A6.

46.

Paula Todd, Prostitution:Off Street, Into Yellow Pages, TORONTO STAR, Apr.

27, 1986, at A3.

47.

Id.

48.

The Toronto Police Department explained its inaction on the grounds that escort

agencies were much more difficult to investigate and in many cases were not illegal.
Interview with Inspector Jim Clark, OIC Toronto Police Morality Division, in Toronto. Ont.

(June 1989). Since telephone lines are not public places, it was not an offence to use them
for soliciting as long as the prostitutes did their own soliciting and as long as they did not use

the same location more than once to service their clients. If the former qualification was
breached, the person doing the soliciting on behalf of the prostitutes could be charged with

"living on the avails" of prostitution. If the same location was used more than once, common
bawdy house charges could be laid.

49.
This was because pimps now found it easier to control their "girls" than when
they were on the streets. While a prostitute working the streets could "turn tricks" without
giving her pimp his share, this would be more difficult in an agency where the pimp could
monitor all calls without leaving the office. The police were virtually powerless to intervene

since all of the activity was underground, and they lacked an effective way of monitoring the
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forced to place increased emphasis on escort agencies, and this
precipitated a gradual increase in street prostitution. The prostitutes
adopted new tactics to cope with police surveillance, and a Provincial
Court decision50 overturning Bill C-49 further increased the numbers
of prostitutes and customers returning to the streets. At this point, the
police changed their tactics and began concentrating on female
prostitutes, but the evidence suggests that their efforts simply displaced
many prostitutes to other areas."1 By August of 1986, street
prostitution had again become a major problem and the police
conducted a prolonged series of sweeps in which female prostitutes
were the major targets. Although Toronto police adopted many of the
tactics being used in Vancouver,52 the increased police activity failed
to produce a significant effect on the prostitution trade.5 3
The controversy and conflict regarding street prostitution
intensified in 1987 despite much more aggressive enforcement of Bill
C-49. The Toronto police formed the Police-Community Prostitution
Committee to facilitate cooperation and information sharing among
residents, business owners, the Crown Attorney's Office and local
politicians. The Committee was primarily intended as a forum for
citizens to express their concerns, and to explore possible solutions to
the increasingly obvious failure of Bill C-49. Prostitutes were
excluded from the Committee, which may explain why it was less
successful than its counterpart in the Strathcona area of Vamcouver.
Furthef, although this Committee likely represented a genuine effort
activities of the pimps. See Todd, supranote 46, at A3.

50.
See supra note 28.
51.
In fact, this may have at least partially accounted for the earlier "success" with
the implementation of the new law. In this respect, J. F. Lockett, Principal of 'Our Lady of
Lourdes Catholic School, complained to Mayor Eggleton that the number of prostitutes
working in his area had increased steadily since Bill C-49 was implemented. See Letter from
J. F. Lockett, Principal of Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic School, to Art Eggleton, Mayor of
Toronto (June 6", 1986).
52.
For example, the Toronto Police Department instituted the practice of detaining
arrested prostitutes overnight, despite the fact that persons charged with summary offenses are
normally released on appearance notices. The Department also asked courts to impose a 9:00
p.m. curfew, combined with area restrictions, as conditions of bail. Yves Lavigne, 25
Prostitutes Charged; Bail Includes a Curfew, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 23, 1986, at A16.
53.

Andrew Duffy, 25 Women are Arrested in Prostitution Crackdown, TORONTO

STAR, Aug. 22, 1986, at Al, A4.
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to deal effectively with citizens' concerns, it also was clearly an
attempt to appease some of the most vocal groups and to subvert local
political activity to serve the interests of the police.' In this respect,
it was relatively successful at minimizing public criticism of the
police, and directing public lobbying efforts against politicians. 55
Although the police department minimized public conflict, it could
not reduce the number of prostitutes. Despite aggressive enforcement
of Bill C-49, the number of prostitutes on the streets doubled between
January and October of 1987.6 The fact that most of this increase
occurred after the police shifted their emphasis from customers to
prostitutes underscored the futility of tougher laws against prostitution.
Although the police ultimately returned to their previous concentration
on customers, there is little evidence to suggest that it was effective.
Although conviction rates remained high, the number of visible
prostitutes also remained high.'
Further, public dissatisfaction
began to grow and the Police-Community Liaison Committee was no
longer able to contain it. In order to appear more effective, the
Toronto Police Department instituted a practice of moving prostitutes
from area to area, never allowing them to stay in one area for lengthy
periods of time.5" These practices have been continued to the present
time, and although some prostitution activity has even been displaced
into Toronto's outer suburbs, this has simply spread the nuisance
problem over a larger area. The Toronto media continues to debate
the prostitution issue and there are constant reports of conflict between
54.
For example, one of the main items of business at the first meeting was to
encourage the various residents' groups to lobby their political representatives for an increase
to the prostitution control budget of the Toronto Police Department. Minutes of CommunityPolice Prostitution Committee (Jan. 15, 1987).
55.
A senior Toronto Police Superintendent informed this writer that he regularly
used the committee to "make noise" when he wanted something from City Hall.
56.
Kirk Makin, Ranks of Toronto ProstitutesIncrease, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 15.
1987, at A3.

57.
This assertion is also supported by the evaluation conducted by the Department
of Justice, which found that the numbers of prostitutes and their working hours had not been
significantly reduced by the law. See SHARON MOYER & PETER J. CARRINOTON, STREET
PROSTITUTION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE LAW - TORONTO 146-49 (Can. Dept. of
Justice, 1989).

58.
Interview with Inspector Jim Clark, supra note 48; Superintendent John Getty,
Chair of Police-Community Liaison Committee, in Toronto, Ont. (June 1989 & June 1992).
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residents and prostitutes. In this respect, it is instructive that local
politicians have started calling for legalized "zones of tolerance" and
bawdy houses.59

In concluding this discussion of Bill C-49 in Toronto, several
additional points need to be addressed. In addition to the general
ineffectiveness of the law, it is also evident that Bill C-49 has caused
confusion and conflict for the operators of escort agencies and bawdy
houses, two types of prostitution which had previously caused few
problems for the police. In addition to the problem with pimps
controlling escort agencies, there were early reports that organized
crime was beginning to move into escort agencies and bawdy
houses,' and that pimps were invading Eaton Centre in a modem
day version of "white slavery" to force runaway girls to work in
escort agencies and bawdy houses. 61 These factors underscore the
problems which accompany attempts to drive prostitution underground
through the use of tough laws.
On the related topic of violence against prostitutes, the evidence
is less clear. Although some prostitutes reported that they felt less
safe after Bill C-49, others reported that there was no appreciable
change.62 Recent media reports and interviews with spokespersons
from the prostitute community indicate that violence is a continuing
problem. Unfortunately, little pre-Bill C-49 evidence is available, so
it is difficult to establish whether the violence is due to the law, or
simply an occupational hazard associated with prostitution,
C. The Communicating Law In Montreal
The implementation of Bill C-49 in Montreal involved many of
the same tactics as were used in Toronto and Vancouver.
Responsibility for enforcing the new law was divided between the

59.
Jane Coutts. Zones of Tolerance'forProstitutes Urged, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct.
26, 1991, at AI0 (quoting Counsellor Jack Layton).
60.
Yves Lavigne, Crackdown on Soliciting is Boon for Escort Services, GLOBE &
MAIL. Sept. 28, 1987, at Al, A2.
61.
Gary Oakes. Pimp JailedAfter Attempting to Force Runaway Girl to Become a
Prostitute.TORONTO STAR. May 12, 1987, at A23.
62.
Moyer & Carrington, supra note 57, at 153-55.
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Morality Division and specialized morality officers attached to the
districts where prostitution was common. The Morality Division
utilized a combination of routine enforcement combined with periodic
blitzes. The district-based morality officers engaged in routine
undercover enforcement, supplemented with harassment activities by
uniformed patrol officers. The Montreal police tactics differed from
those in other cities in that a significant proportion of charges were
based on the surveillance of prostitutes and customers, instead of the
reliance on entrapment techniques used elsewhere. The Montreal
Police Department also set specific quotas for male customers and
often used major blitzes as a means of ensuring that the male/female
ratios remained relatively equal. In addition, because male prostitution
was concentrated in Parc Fontaine, the police enforced the law against
male prostitutes much more than occurred in the other cities.63
The law initially appeared to have a deterrent effect and early
media reports indicated that a drastic drop in the number of visible
prostitutes had occurred. However, spokespersons for the prostitute
community stated that prostitutes were simply waiting for the situation
to stabilize. 4 They returned to the streets in numbers once the initial
blitzes ended, and by the summer of 1986 politicians were once again
debating the possibility of decriminalization and other options to
control street prostitution.0 This debate continued throughout the
next few years as it became increasingly apparent that Bill C-49 was
not working. Although the police continued to express satisfaction
with the law, independent research conducted by the federal
Department of Justice failed to disclose any clear-cut reduction in the
numbers of prostitutes working in Montreal.' While there was a

63.
Flieschman, supra note 5, at 43.
64.
Peggy Curran, Prostitutes Shun Streets But Still Work, MONTREAL GAzErrE,
Feb. 5, 1986, at A3.
65.
Irwin Block, Dupras Vow: I'll Rid the City of 'Menace' of Prostitution,

MONTREAL GAzETTE, Oct. 9, 1986. at A3 (quoting Claude Dupras, then candidate for Mayor
of Montreal).
66.
ROBERT GEMME, STREET PROSTITUTION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE LAW -

MONTREAL (Can. Dept. of Justice, 1989). It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about
the overall effect of the law because there are no reliable counts of visible prostitutes prior
to Bill C-49. However, this study reported a Montreal police estimate that there were
between 300 and 350 regular street prostitutes in 1984. Id. at 184. The research conducted
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reduction in the numbers operating in the central part of the city,
many of these were simply displaced to other areas. 67 Further, there
is evidence that a prolonged series of blitzes in the main prostitution
area during June of 1987 did not significantly reduce the numbers of
prostitutes over the long term. 68
An interesting side effect of the implementation of Bill C-49
involves the degree of public controversy and conflict over street
prostitution. Generally, all sources agree that there was little public
outcry prior to the new law, largely because most of the street
prostitution was concentrated in non-residential areas. However,
police pressure, combined with court-imposed area restrictions, forced
many prostitutes out of their regular locations into residential areas.
This instigated a significant increase in the number of complaints from
citizens and led to a political debate over the efficacy of police
tactics.69 Although the police initially responded quickly to these
complaints, they only succeeded in driving the prostitutes back to their
traditional areas.7" This has since developed into a similar situation
to that in Vancouver and Toronto, in which prostitutes are routinely
displaced back and forth between different areas. The police have
stopped responding to public complaints and have instead blamed the
problem on authorities in Ottawa. The conflict has escalated, and
even led to the creation of vigilante groups in some areas. The police
have not attempted to stop the vigilante groups from attacking
prostitutes; the vigilante groups have even been joined by area
politicians.7"
In summarizing this discussion of Bill C-49 in Montreal, it is
important to stress that the Montreal police maintains that the new law
after the law came into effect confirmed that at least 530 different female street prostitutes
were arrested between 1986 and 1987. Id. at 185.
67.
Id. at 182-83.
68.
Id. at 185-86.
69.
Janet Bagnall, Residents Want to Get Prostitutes Off Their Streets', MONTREAL
GAZETTE, Apr. 27, 1991, at Al, A8; David Johnston, ResidentsAngry at Oldest Profession's
New Beat. MONTREAL GAZETTE, Sept. 9, 1991, at A3.
70.
Susan Semenak, Police Ridding Neighborhood of Prostitutes, Residents Say,

MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 1991, at A4.
71.
Andre Picard. ProstitutesHunted by Vigilantes and Clients, GLOBE & MAIL,
June 30. 1993, at A5.
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is successful. In this respect, it is interesting that Montreal is unique
among the three cities in having a workable anti-soliciting bylaw on
the books. 2 Although the police argues that Bill C-49 is superior
because it is criminal legislation, the penalties are very similar and the
police have almost identical powers of arrest under both laws. Indeed,
the arrest statistics for the period 1985 (pre-Bill C-49) to 1987 indicate
that the police laid similar numbers of charges under the bylaw in
1985 as they did under Bill C-49 between 1986 and 1987."
However, the bylaw does not apply to clients, and thus there is no
question that more clients are being charged under Bill C-49. In this
respect, the Montreal police had a slightly better record of equal
enforcement of Bill C-49 against male customers and female
prostitutes than the other cities.74
The final issue which needs to be addressed regarding the
implementation of Bill C-49 involves the question of violence against
prostitutes. In this respect, Montreal has not experienced the wave of
prostitute murders that have occurred in Vancouver and Toronto. As
well, the Montreal police indicated in 1987 that they had not seen an
appreciable increase in assaults against prostitutes.
However,
prostitutes and social workers interviewed for the Department of
Justice evaluation contradicted this, arguing that there had been an
increase in violence since 1984, but that most prostitutes did not report
it to the police.75 In addition, many prostitutes also indicated that
they felt less safe and had experienced more hostility from customers
since the law was implemented. Considering the wave of vigilante
violence against prostitutes, and the ongoing political conflict since
Bill C-49 was implemented, it seems obvious that the Montreal police
are using different criteria for "success" than those posited at the
72.
See Gemme, supranote 66. at 185. Montreal passed an initial by-law dealing
only with soliciting which fell into disuse after the Supreme Court of Canada overturned
similar by-laws in other cities. The current by-law prohibits any form of public soliciting
(prostitution or otherwise) and has withstood challenges to Quebec Superior Court. Mario
Clement v. R. (1984) (cited in Genune, supra note 66. at 42).
73.

Id. at 107.

74.

Id. at 108. The actual percentages were as follows: female prostitutes. 47.5%:

male prostitutes, 17.5%; male clients, 35.0%. Thus, in total, more males than females were

charged under Bill C-49 between 1986 and 1987.
75.
Id. at 183.
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beginning of this article.
D. Summary And Conclusions About the Effect of Bill C-49
In concluding this discussion of Bill C-49 in Vancouver, Toronto
and Montreal, several important similarities can be identified. The
most obvious similarity is that none of the three cities adopted a
consistent policy regarding the implementation of the law. While
initial crackdowns were instituted in all cities immediately after the
law was proclaimed, they were short in duration and universally failed
to reduce prostitution over the long term. Although these crackdowns
displaced prostitutes from their traditional areas, they did not resolve
the conflict among prostitutes, residents and business owners, and
even created conflict in Montreal where none had existed prior to the
law. Further, once it became obvious that the law was not reducing
the numbers of prostitutes, the police in all three cities adopted shortterm crisis management tactics, in which they attempted to minimize
public complaints by constantly displacing the prostitutes from area to
area so that they were never allowed to remain in any particular area
for a prolonged length of time. Although this approach did reduce
some conflict, it largely relied on traffic checks and other harassment
techniques, and did not entail the enforcement of Bill C-49 itself. In
any event, these harassment tactics were much less successful than the
negotiated approach used by the Vancouver police in Strathcona,
which was the only time that police were able to effectively manage
the conflict over street prostitution.
In addition to the general ineffectiveness of Bill C-49 at reducing
either the numbers of prostitutes or the amount of political conflict, it
was also only marginally effective at reducing the gender-based
disparity which has traditionally characterized the control of
prostitution. Although the intent was to implement the law in a
gender-neutral fashion, gender-based disparities appeared in all three
cities. The most pronounced disparity, however, was in Vancouver,
and it is perhaps significant that Vancouver was also characterized by
much higher rates of violence against prostitutes than occurred in
either Toronto or Montreal. This violent trend was also evident in the
other cities, as prostitutes reported being forced to adopt riskier
operating styles and feeling less safe than prior to the law.
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IIl. PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED DECRIMINALIZATION

In the final analysis, the implementation of Bill C-49 in
Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal failed to achieve any of its major
objectives, and the only instances of successful prostitution control
were achieved through tactics which were not dependent on the law.
The remainder of this article will be concerned with outlining a
decriminalized approach to prostitution control which appears
mandated by the overwhelming failure of one of the toughest criminal
approaches to prostitution control in contemporary western societies.
In this respect, the basic tenet of the approach is that most
prostitution-related offenses should be decriminalized and regulated
though statutes similar to those used to regulate other businesses. The
relative success of the bylaws used in Montreal, Vancouver and
Calgary suggest that such an approach would work as long as
prostitutes are legally allowed to work somewhere.76
Another crucial aspect of a decriminalized approach to prostitution
control involves the ability of prostitutes to work legally in fixed
locations as long as they did not contravene other laws which might
apply to the area. This was recommended by the Fraser Committee
but rejected by the Ministry of Justice on the grounds that prostitutes
would probably use their apartments to service clients picked up on the
street.7 It was argued that this would not reduce street prostitution
and might cause additional problems in apartment buildings. It was
also argued that bawdy houses are currently uncommon even though
they are rarely prosecuted, and that this indicates that most prostitutes
prefer to work on the street. Both of these arguments are considered
76.
It should be noted that the author is intentionally distinguishing between
*decriminalization" and "legalization." The former implies repealing criminal laws against
prostitution and using general civil laws, e.g., zoning and noise by-laws, to control any
instances of conflict. Legalization, as it is practiced in some European countries, involves
establishing government run houses of prostitution, maintaining prostitution registers and
licencing prostitutes. It must be emphasized that the author is not in favour of "legalization,"
as it simply places the state in the role of the "pimp" and is more oppressive for the individual
prostitutes.
Most Canadian prostitutes have argued that they favor the current
.criminalization" model over the legalization model. Telephone interview with Valerie Scott.
President of the Canadian Organization of Prostitutes (CORP) (June 1989): Marie Arrington,
supra note 27.
77.
See Larsen, Legalization, supra note 8. at 22.
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invalid because they fail to consider the fact that prostitutes are not
currently allowed to advertise the locations of bawdy houses to attract
clients. Legalized bawdy houses would likely become much more
common and thereby reduce the nuisance associated with street
prostitution. They would also increase the safety of prostitutes, who
would be able to operate in small groups for mutual protection.
Finally, it is also recommended that local governments be
empowered to establish legal prostitution areas through the same
zoning laws as are used to regulate other forms of land use. Although
there is some legitimate concern that this approach would create areas
of concentrated vice, this approach has been successful in Europe.
Research indicates that prostitutes would be willing to adhere to
zoning restrictions as long as there is a designated area where they can
operate legally. In any case, it is further recommended that areas
which permit legal prostitution be required to establish prostitution
committees comprised of residents, business owners, prostitutes,
politicians and police representatives.
The function of these
committees would be to monitor the prostitution trade and liaise
among the various groups to identify and resolve problems before they
become serious. In this respect, it is essential that any discussions
regarding the control of prostitution include the prostitutes themselves.
It is only by encouraging a dialogue between them and other affected
groups that the conflict which so frequently characterizes the issue can
be eliminated.
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